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UNEQUAL ACCESS: THE CRISIS OF HEALTH CARE
INEQUALITY FOR LOW-INCOME AFRICAN-AMERICAN
RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROBYN WHIPPLE DIAZ*

"There is a health care crisis in our city... when the life expectancy of
our African-American men is 10 years less than the rest of America, and
when this country's highest rates of infant mortality, diabetes, and HIV
infection are in our own backyard, it is time to fix health care in
Washington."-Mayor Anthony A. Williams'
"Of all forms of inequality, injustice in health 2care is the most shocking
and inhumane."--Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

Merely three years ago, District of Columbia Mayor Anthony Williams
proclaimed that health care is a "right" and he expressed continued commitment to
the elimination of health disparities in the District, particularly those based on race
and income.3 For years, the Mayor and the D.C. Department of Health have
voiced concerns regarding the limited access to health care providers facing
residents of Southeast D.C., and have publicized their goals of ensuring the
stability of hospitals in that quadrant. Yet despite the myriad speeches and
proposals, poor minority residents of Southeast D.C. face ever-increasing obstacles
to the access of basic health care services.

*B.A., Brandeis University, 1998; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, May 2003. The author is
an associate in the health law practice group at Crowell & Moring in Washington, D.C. Thanks to
Professor Sheryll Cashin for her advice and guidance, and to the author's family and friends for their
support.
1. Neighborhood Action Alert, District of Columbia Mayor's Office (Mar. 12, 2001), at
http://www.dc.gov/mayor/news/2001/march/03 12_01 naa.shtm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
2. D.C. PRIMARY CARE Ass'N, DCPCA HEALTH JUSTICE UPDATE, SAFETY NET REFORM 1 (Apr.

29, 2003) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.).
3. Press Release, D.C. Mayor's Office, Mayor's Commitment to a Healthy District of Columbia,
(Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.dc.gov/mayor/news/statement.asp?id=80&mon=200102&archive= 1 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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The safety-net hospitals that traditionally served the most economically
depressed and hypersegregated 4 area of the District are now imperiled. D.C.
General Hospital's inpatient services were terminated in 2001, leaving only the
emergency room and several clinics open at the D.C. General site. In early 2003,
an agreement was reached to close the emergency department which had long
served as the primary provider of medical services for uninsured patients in need of
health care but who lacked the financial resources to pay for it. 5 Greater Southeast
Community Hospital, the only remaining acute care hospital in the Southeast
quadrant, has filed for bankruptcy protection. Its financial woes gravely impact its
ability to care for the District's neediest residents, as electricity outages, staff
layoffs, and emergency room closures are common occurrences.6 The situation at
Greater Southeast is so dire that the hospital has lost its accreditation from the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), which may
result in its ineligibility for receipt of Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement, the
lifeblood of any hospital serving the poor.
Without access to these hospitals, many of D.C.'s poor African-American
residents face extremely limited access to health care services, while those in the
remainder of the metropolitan area choose from an abundance of providers vying
to serve them. In order to receive preventive care, residents of Southeast D.C.
often must travel to another neighborhood, one with which they are likely
unfamiliar, or forgo care altogether.7 The sickest patients, those in need of
emergency treatment, may be diverted to hospitals several miles away.
This paper argues that combined racial and economic segregation in
hypersegregated inner city neighborhoods have created a crisis of health care
access for poor, African-American residents. The focus of this paper is on the
concentration of black poverty in Southeast D.C., which has created significant
unmet demand for health care services and has been exacerbated by federal and
local failures to effectively address the impact of geography on access to care.
Part I describes the gap in accessible care caused by concentrated AfricanAmerican poverty. Accessibility of health care is measured by the affordability

4. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE

MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74 (1993). Hypersegregation is a term coined by Douglas Massey and
Nancy Denton. It refers to the severely high levels of segregation faced by many poor blacks living in
America's inner cities. Hypersegregation occurs when blacks are highly segregated on four of five
dimensions at once. Those dimensions are: (1) unevenness; (2) racial isolation; (3) clustering of black
neighborhoods; (4) concentration of blacks in a geographic area; and (5) centralization of blacks in a
geographic area. Id.
5. D. C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N, supra note 2, at 6-7.

6. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
7. A small number of primary care clinics are located in Southeast D.C. and are operated by
organizations such as Unity Health Care and Children's National Medical Center. D.C. PRIMARY CARE
ASS'N, PRIMARY CARE SAFETY NET: HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR THE MEDICALLY VULNERABLE IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 8-9

app.C (Oct. 2003)
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and location of services. Part I will illustrate that the high number of poor AfricanAmerican residents who are uninsured or on Medicaid, combined with a maldistribution of primary care and emergency services, leaves many of Southeast
D.C.'s residents without access to health care. Part II is a critique of federal and
local decisions that have exacerbated this crisis, such as federal threats to cut
disproportionate share payments to safety-net hospitals and the District
government's apparent inability to ensure the survival of at least one fully
functioning hospital in Southeast D.C. Finally, Part III sets forth the normative
arguments for the provision of accessible health care to those in concentrated
African-American poverty and recommends several policies that would address the
ways in which geography structures the inaccessibility of health care services.
This paper concludes that geographic health care gaps in areas of concentrated
black poverty can be redressed by (1) simultaneously preserving affordable access
to hospitals, and (2) increasing the number of primary care physicians practicing in
hypersegregated areas, such as Southeast D.C.

I. A POPULATION AT RISK

A. Economic and RacialSegregation Create ConcentratedBlack Poverty.
Low-income households are disproportionately urban, and economic
segregation has created "poverty pockets," or areas of concentrated poverty, in
many inner cities. 8
The racial segregation that has persisted in this country has caused these
poverty pockets to be inhabited primarily by African-Americans. 9 Douglas
Massey and Nancy Denton concluded that African-Americans remained heavily
segregated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and that one-third of AfricanAmericans lived "under conditions of intense racial segregation." '
Although racial segregation in the United States decreased between 1980 and
2000, the 2000 Census clearly indicated that residential segregation for African-

8. JAMES W.

FOSSETT & JANET

D. PERLOFF,

THE KAISER COMM'N ON

THE FUTURE OF

MEDICAID, THE "NEw" HEALTH REFORM AND ACCESS TO CARE: THE PROBLEM OF THE INNER CITY 8

(1995). Studies suggest that economic segregation continues to increase. Id. at 11-12. "In 1990, about
2800 census tracts (out of 45,000 total) had poverty rates in excess of forty percent of the tract
population, compared to about 1000 in 1970."
Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and
MetropolitanEquity Strategies,8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11,11(1997).
9. FoSSETr & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 8. "Low-income households, particularly blacks, have
become increasingly concentrated in depressed inner-city areas." Id
10. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4,at 75-77.
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Americans remained higher than for all other racial or ethnic groups.'" Racial
segregation rates remain extremely high, particularly in large cities with significant
African-American populations. 12 Approximately 60% of African-Americans live
3
in large urban areas, compared with 46% of whites.'
In many cities, out-migration of people and employers to the suburbs make it
difficult for poor minorities to access jobs and educational opportunities in
suburban locations, leaving them trapped in hypersegregated inner city
neighborhoods.
"Because racial segregation concentrates poverty and
systematically builds deprivation into the residential structure of black
communities, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have deemed it 'the principal
feature of American Society that is responsible for the creation of the urban
underclass. "14
1. RacialSegregationand Poverty in the Districtof Columbia
The percentage of people in the District living in poverty is highly
concentrated, and increased during the 1980s and 1990s. 5 In 1998, the D.C.
poverty rate was approximately 22%, with one in five District residents living in
poverty. 16
Pockets of concentrated poverty in the District are primarily
concentrated east of the Anacostia River, in Wards 6, 7, and 8. More than twothirds of the District's poverty census tracts (where poverty was 30% or more) are
17
located in those three wards.

11. See JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS PUB. No.
CENSR-3, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, 59,
95 (2002), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-3.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
12. Id.at 59. The 2000 Census revealed that metropolitan areas with I million or more people had
higher residential segregation than middle-sized or small metropolitan areas. Id. In addition, the
dissimilarity index was higher in areas with large African-American populations. Id. at 64.
13. FoSSETT & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 4 (citing William H. Frey, The New Urban Revival in the
UnitedStates, 30 URB. STUD. 741, 754 (1993)).
14. Bollens, supra note 8, at I I (quoting MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 9). Whether or not
you agree with the term "urban underclass," many scholars have accepted the notion that racial
segregation and economic segregation combine to create what might be considered dismal living
conditions for many African-Americans. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Civil Rights in the New Decade: The
Geographyof Opportunity, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 467, 470 (2001) ("[O]ne third of all African Americans
live in hypersegregated communities that none of us would choose for ourselves--communities where
children and adults are frequently terrorized by violence, where schools typically perform far below the
standards necessary for participation in the economic and educational mainstream, and often where
more men are not working than are working.").
15. CAROL J. DE VITA ET AL., CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY & THE URBAN INST.,
POVERTY N D.C.-THEN AND Now 15-16 fig.7 (2000).

16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. Ward 8 suffers from the highest poverty rate in D.C., with 38% of all residents and more
than 50% of children living in poverty. D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., PRIMARY CARE SAFETY NET:
HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR THE MEDICALLY VULNERABLE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 9-10

(2002).
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Massey and Denton's findings regarding concentrated black poverty come to
life in D.C. Approximately 60% of D.C.'s 572,000 residents are AfricanAmerican; and African-Americans, particularly those who are low-income, are
heavily concentrated in the Southeast quadrant of the District.' 8 Low-income
African-Americans are four times more likely than low-income whites to live in
the inner city, and twenty-five times more likely to live in high poverty
neighborhoods, resulting in heavily concentrated black poverty. 19 The extent of
concentrated black poverty in D.C. is revealed by 2000 Census numbers,
illustrating that one-quarter of D.C.'s African-American population lives in
poverty, comprising more than three-quarters of all D.C. residents living in
poverty.20
The dissimilarity index is often used to measure residential segregation by
"compar[ing] the spatial distributions of different groups among units in a
metropolitan area.",21 The United States Census describes the dissimilarity index
as a means of measuring "the percentage of a group's population that would have
to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that
group as the metropolitan areas overall. 22 Use of the dissimilarity index indicates
that segregation of African-Americans from whites in the D.C. metropolitan area is
high-63 on a scale of 0 to 100.23

2. Health Risks Arisingfrom Economic and RacialSegregation
Poverty-relatedHealth Problems
As a result of the concentrated minority poverty found in inner cities,
poverty-related health problems are also disproportionately high in the inner city.
The geographic concentration of poverty in areas with higher-than-average
exposure to occupational and environmental hazards puts poor inner city residents
at higher risk for conditions such as asthma and cancer.24 The poor and uninsured

18. D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, at 6; BARBARA ORMOND ET AL., THE URBAN
INST., HEALTH CARE FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2 (1999). More than
90% of the population of Wards 7 and 8 are African-American. D. C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra
note 17, at 7.
19. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & CHRISTOPHER HAYES, THE URBAN INST., POOR PEOPLE AND
POOR NEIGHBORHOODS

IN THE

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN

AREA 2

(1997),

available at

http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=6565 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
20. D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, at 9. In comparison, only 8% of D.C.'s white
population lives in poverty. Id.
21. ICELAND ETAL., supra note 11, at 119 app. B,
22. ICELAND ET AL., supra note 11, at 119 app. B.
23. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., THE FANNIE MAE FOUND. & THE URBAN INST., HOUSING
NTHE NATION'S CAPITAL 3 (2002).
24. See DENNIS P. ANDRULIS & BETSY CARRIER, MANAGED CARE AND THE INNER CITY: THE
UNCERTAIN PROMISE FOR PROVIDERS, PLANS AND COMMUNITIES 1-3, 11-14 (1999); FOSSETr &
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are also less likely than the affluent to have a regular source of health care, either
because such care is unaffordable or because it is simply not available in their
neighborhoods. 25 Lack of access to care may lead to further decline in the health
status of the poor.
Race-relatedHealth Problems
Certain health conditions are experienced at disproportionately high rates in
the African-American community. African-Americans live, on average, six years
less than whites and have higher rates of infectious disease and certain cancers than
the general population. 26 In addition, African-Americans living in the inner city
have significantly higher-than-average asthma and cirrhosis-related death rates.27
Concentrated black poverty in D.C. means that national health statistics for
African-Americans are not only reflected within the District, but in many cases the
District's statistics are worse. D.C.'s Commission on Public Health found that
African-Americans in the District "were more than four times as likely as whites to
die prematurely (before 65), of heart disease, asthma, pneumonia, and some
cancers. ' 28 The life expectancy of African-American men in the District is ten
years less than the average life expectancy in the rest of the nation. 29 The 2000
D.C. infant mortality rate for African-American mothers was nearly 10 times
higher than the rate for white mothers, while nationally the infant mortality rate for
African-American mothers was 2.5 times that for white mothers. 30
Not
surprisingly, the Southeast quadrant, suffering from both concentrated poverty and
racial segregation, has the city's highest risk of infant mortality, heart disease, and
31

cancer.

supra note 8, at 22 ("The disparity in health status between poor, high-risk, inner-city
populations and more prosperous, lower risk, suburban ones is likely compounded by reduced access to
adequate diet and housing, greater exposure to drugs and STDs, and higher stress and uncertainty
associated with inner-city residence.").
25. ANDRULIS & CARRIER, supra note 24, at 15-16.
26. ANDRULIS & CARRIER, supra note 24, at 12-13.
27. ANDRULIS & CARRIER, supra note 24, at 13.
28. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Health Problems of Inner City PoorReaching Crisis Point, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1990, at A 1.
29. Neighborhood Action Alert, supra note 1; BUILDING A CITY THAT WORKS FOR EVERYONE,
NEIGHBORHOOD BY NEIGHBORHOOD, BUILDING A COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, at 7-2,
available at http://www.dc.gov/mayor/policyagenda/pdf/14 chapter 7.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004);
David Brown & Avram Goldstein, Death Knocks Soonerfor D.C. 's Black Men, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
1997, at Al.
30. D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, at 14; MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU,
DHHS, CHILD HEALTH USA 2002 23 (2002), available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/mchb/chusa02.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
31. ORMOND, ET AL., supra note 18, at 2. Note that the District as a whole has the highest infant
mortality rate in the country. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
PERLOFF,
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B. Impediments to Health CareAccess in Poor,Minority Communities.
1. Lack ofAccess to Primary Care Services
Access to primary care services is generally considered vital for good
Most urban areas have a generous supply of physicians, including
health.
primary care physicians. The location of teaching hospitals in urban centers with
large populations and a significant number of hospitals make cities an attractive

place for physicians to practice.33
Unfortunately, the abundance of physicians in many urban areas typically
does not translate into an adequate supply of physicians within inner cities,
particularly those with poor, minority populations. The urban poor frequently have
difficulty obtaining primary care services. "A study of 10 urban areas between
1963 and 1980 found a 45% decline in the availability of office-based primary care

in poverty-stricken areas.

34

Shortages of primary care physicians (PCPs) in inner

cities have been attributed to a number of disincentives for primary care physicians
to locate in economically depressed urban areas, including the presence of (1)
fewer people with "disposable income" and greater reliance on Medicaid; (2) high

levels of drug abuse, violence, and poverty; and (3) a "[s]icker population,
35

language differences, higher rates of noncompliance and missed appointments."
Low Medicaid physician payments and high administrative costs associated
with Medicaid also may discourage physicians from practicing in poor, medically
underserved communities.36 In order to prosper with a substantial number of

Ward 7 has the highest
homicide rate in the city, as well as the city's highest death rates due to cancer and diabetes. Id. Ward
8 has the highest number of teen births, infant deaths, and low birth weight babies in the city. D.C.
PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, at app. A, 69, 72 (2002).
32. Noah Lewin-Epstein, Determinants of Regular Source of Health Care in Black, Mexican,
Puerto Rican, and Non-Hispanic White Populations, 29 MED. CARE 543, 544 (1991) ("[A] regular
source of care is believed to facilitate timely and continuous treatment and contribute to better health.");
see also Leiyo Shi, The Relationship Between Primary Care and Life Chances, 3 J. HEALTH CARE
POOR & UNDERSERVED 321, 321-25 (1992) (finding that access to a PCP is more significantly
correlated to good health than availability of hospitals or specialty care physicians).
UNION: A 2002 ACTION GUIDE TO LEAVE No CHILD BEHIND 47 (2002).

33. FOSSETr & PERLOFF, supranote 8, at 24.

34. American College of Physicians, Inner-City Health Care, 126 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.,
485,487 (1997).
35. ANDRULIS & CARRIER, supra note 24, at 20.
36. FOSSETT & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 27. Physicians and advocates contend that increased
physician reimbursement under Medicaid might make working in poor areas more lucrative. FOSSETT &
PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 50. Many advocates for the poor have argued that the District government
should change its method of calculating Medicaid provider payments in order to increase Medicaid fees
for physician services. Chris Silva, Medicaid Rate Increases Unlikely til '03, WASH. BUS. J., April 6,
2001,
available
at
http://washington.bizjoumals.com/washington/stories/2001/04/09
/story6.html?t=-printable (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); Medicaid fees for physician services in the District
lag behind most other metropolitan areas, making it undesirable for health care providers to accept
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Medicaid patients, a doctor needs to subsidize the costs of participating in
Medicaid with privately insured patients, who are charged higher-than-normal
prices for care. 37 The segregation of poor populations, particularly poor AfricanAmerican populations, however, makes it unlikely that doctors frequently succeed
in attracting such a mix of clients.38
Limited access to PCPs for the poor means that African-Americans living in
concentrated poverty receive regular care less frequently than others, and may
instead rely on hospital-based care. 39 Care received by low-income African
Americans in urban areas is often "hospital-dependent, crisis-oriented, episodic
and fragmented. ' 4° Studies have shown that low-income African-Americans may
have a preference for hospital-based care. This "preference" may be attributed to
any of the following factors: (a) residential segregation and location of hospitals in
low-income African-American neighborhoods; (b) lack of private physicians with
offices in low-income African-American neighborhoods; (c) perceived cultural
competency of hospitals; or (d) financial barriers to seeing private physicians, such
as insurance requirements and co-payments.4 1
Reliance on hospital-based care means that many poor African-Americans
delay seeking treatment for medical problems and fail to receive the preventive
care often necessary to detect health problems.42 In addition, unnecessary use of
hospital-based care results in higher health care expenditures for public safety net
programs.43 This problem has been recognized by the D.C. government, which has
repeatedly cited the need for affordable primary care services in poor, minority
neighborhoods. 44

Medicaid patients. MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID
REIMBURSEMENT (Aug. 2001), availableat http://www.msdc.org/bodymedicaid brief.htm (last visited

Jan. 31, 2004). However, some studies indicate that physicians would not change their practices for
small income increases. Rather, the substantial income increases that would be needed to entice
physicians to these areas may be unrealistic, particularly in light of budget shortfalls and a national
trend toward reducing Medicaid funding. FOsSETT & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 50-52.
37. FosSETT & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 27.
38. FOSSETT & PERLOFF, supranote 8, at 27.
39. Studies have demonstrated that many low-income African-Americans obtain hospital-based
care at significantly higher rates than whites. See Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Site of Medical Care:
Do Racial and Ethnic Differences Persist? I YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 15, 28 (2001)
(finding that African-Americans are "twice as likely as whites to rely on a hospital-based provider as a
source of regular care.").
40. American College of Physicians, supra note 34, at 487 (citing Gerald E. Thomson, Health Care
in Underserved Urban America: Implications for National Health Reform (1993) (unpublished paper,
presented at conference sponsored by Columbia University, New York )).
41. Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 39, at 29.
42. Lewin-Epstein, supra note 32, at 544-45.
43. Lewin-Epstein, supra note 32, at 544.
44. See Neighborhood Action Alert, supra note 1;Letter from D.C. Mayor Anthony A. Williams,
to District Residents (Mar. 28, 2001), available at http://www.dc.gov/mayor/healthcare/letter.shtm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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An example of the extent of primary care accessibility problems in the
District is the distribution of pediatricians in the city. The American Academy of
Pediatrics says that an area is underserved if there are more than 2,500 children per
pediatrician. 45 The affluent Northwest quadrant and the suburb of Bethesda,
Maryland combined have a pediatrician-to-child ratio of 1 to 400, while the
Southeast quadrant has a ratio of 1 to 3,700.46 Wards 6, 7, and 8, comprising the
most economically depressed areas of the city, have a combined total of 29
pediatricians, with a ratio of 6.4 pediatricians for every 10,000 children.47 These
numbers are shocking, particularly given the fact that equal percentages (roughly
25%) of the city's population live in the Northwest and Southeast quadrants.48
The inequalities do not end with access to pediatricians. More affluent areas
of the District have more than three times the number of PCPs than the poorer
neighborhoods. 49 The District has more than double the number of generalists
(another terms for a PCP) per 100,000 population than the nation as a whole, but
there are more than twice as many people in the District underserved by PCPs than
in the rest of the nation (approximately 25% in the District as compared with 9.5%
for the United States).50 Despite the high number of providers per capita, 71 of
D.C.'s 192 census tracts are designated as health professional shortage areas
(HPSAs).f
2. FinancialBarriersto Care
A major obstacle in obtaining access to health care is economic. Provision
of services to those without adequate medical insurance is unattractive to health
care providers, and may cause hospitals and individual physicians to terminate or
severely limit services to the uninsured. Low Medicaid reimbursement for
physician services and for emergency and outpatient care also makes Medicaid
52
recipients less desirable than patients with other types of insurance.
Communities with substantial numbers of residents incapable of paying for

45. FOSSETr & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 24.
46. ANDRULIS & CARRIER, supra note 24, at 19.
47. Thomas W. Chapman, Inadequate Primary Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A20,
available at 2003 WL 2367246.
48. BARBARA A. ORMOND &

RANDALL R.

BOVBJERG, THE URBAN INST., THE CHANGING

HOSPITAL SECTOR IN WASHINGTON, D.C.: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POOR 11 (1998).

49. ORMOND, ET AL., supra note 18, at 6.
50. STATE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV. AGENCY, D.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH, PRELIMINARY DRAF.

PRIMARY CARE CHAPTER, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATE HEALTH SYSTEMS PLAN 10-11 tbl. 1 (2003).
51. ORMOND & BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 10. HPSAs and medically underserved areas
(MUAs) are "geographic area[s], population group[s], or medical facilit[ies] that ha[ve] been designated
by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services as having a shortage of health
professionals." NAT'L HEALTH SERV. CORPS, DHHS, HEALTH PROFESSIONAL SHORTAGE AREAS FACT

SHEET, available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/dchosp.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
52. See FOSSETr & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 27.

2004]

UNEQUAL ACCESS

medical services often have difficulty convincing health care providers to remain
within the neighborhood.53 This trend is especially problematic in poor black
communities, possibly because of the large number of African-Americans who are
uninsured.54 This is best illustrated in Southeast D.C. where high numbers of poor
African-Americans, who are uninsured or on Medicaid, face a severe shortage of
accessible health care providers.
The Uninsuredand the Problem of UncompensatedCare
More than forty-one million people in the United States were uninsured in
2001.
The large number of uninsured individuals requiring medical care forces
many health care organizations to provide uncompensated care, meaning care that
is not paid for by insurance (public or private) or personally by the patient. It is
estimated that in 2001, such organizations provided $34.5 billion in
In 1999, hospitals alone
uncompensated care to uninsured individuals.56
(excluding physicians and community health centers) provided $20.8 billion in
uncompensated care, an amount equivalent to more than 6% of their total
expenditures.57 Uncompensated care cuts into hospitals' bottom lines, reducing
operating margins and straining their financial stability.
The challenge of financing health care for the poor is exacerbated by the
concentration of minority poverty in the District. Approximately 30% of District
residents below 200% of the federal poverty level are uninsured,58 and a full 20%
of the general D.C. population is uninsured. 59 A disproportionate share of the
District's uninsured are concentrated in Southeast D.C., with 38% residing in
Wards 6, 7 and 8.60 Thus, any health care provider located in Southeast D.C. will
be faced with a higher uncompensated care burden than providers geographically
located in more affluent neighborhoods.

53. Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, Access to Health Care: What a Difference Shades of Color Make,
12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 126 (2003).

54. Id. at 123 (stating that the national uninsured rate for African-Americans is 22.8%, compared
with 12.7% for whites).
55. Jack Hadley & John Holahan, How Much Medical CareDo the UninsuredUse, and Who Pays
For It?, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-66 (Feb. 12, 2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org
/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.66v1.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
56. Id. at W3-69.
57. Id. at W3-70.
58. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
59. ORMOND & BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 1.
60. NICOLE LURIE & MICHAEL STOTO, RAND, HEALTH INSURANCE STATUS IN THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA 9 tbl.5 (2002), availableat http://www.dcpca.org/media/rand%20report.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2004).
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Reliance on Medicaid
Medicaid insures one in seven Americans under age 65.61 Under federal
guidelines, each state establishes its own benefits packages, provider payment
rates, and eligibility standards. 62 Until the late 1990s, the District's federal
matching rate for Medicaid was 50%; it was increased to 70% under the District of
63
Columbia Revitalization provisions of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.
The District's per capita Medicaid expenditures in 1996 were the highest of
all the states.64 The District's high level of Medicaid expenditures can be partly
attributed to the city's high poverty levels and to the significant health problems
faced by poor District residents. For example, the District has the highest rate of
AIDS cases reported per 100,000 population of all states and the second highest
rate of new cancer cases per 100,000 population.65 When a state has a high
number of enrollees with conditions that are expensive to treat, high expenses are
unavoidable.
Approximately one-fifth of D.C.'s population is comprised of Medicaid
beneficiaries. 66 "D.C. ranks second highest among the states in the number of
Medicaid beneficiaries as a percentage of state population., 67 The percentage of
Medicaid recipients residing in Southeast D.C. is particularly high, with 48% of all
adult Medicaid recipients and 53.2% of all child Medicaid recipients residing in
Wards 6, 7 and 8.68 Thus, health care providers located in or near Southeast D.C.
serve a disproportionately high number of Medicaid patients and are financially
dependent on Medicaid. They are also particularly vulnerable to cuts in Medicaid
funding.

61. NAT'L

ASS'N OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITALS & RELATED INSTS.,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEDICAID FACTS, available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/washing/elections.mfs us.pdf (last visited

Jan. 31, 2004).
62. Id.
63. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 7. D.C. had 127,500 people enrolled in Medicaid in 2000,
an increase of 13,000 people from 1998. D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, at 3.
64. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 9. Note that comparisons of per capita spending are
affected by number of persons enrolled, poverty rates, and costs. See ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at
14.

65.
66.
67.
68.

ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 15.
ORMOND & BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 1.
ORMOND & BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 9.
D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N., supra note 17, App. A, at 68-74.
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II. THE DISTRICT'S SAFETY NET FAILURE

A. D.C. GeneralHospital-What Went Wrong?
For almost 200 years, D.C. General Hospital was the place where the
District's poorest, sickest residents were treated. It was by far the most active
trauma center in the District, with 2,000 major trauma cases annually, and one of
the ten busiest in the nation.69 It was also a place where ordinary people, usually
poor minorities, came to be treated for less serious conditions: "[I]n come people
for treatment of their ulcers and diabetes and stomachaches and dizzy spells
people looking for free
because they know of nowhere else to go; in come
70
medicine, free food, free shelter from cold weather .....
Yet, in 2001, the hospital's inpatient unit was closed, and the emergency
7 1
room was closed in 2003 and replaced with an urgent care clinic. The closure of
D.C. General, combined with the serious financial and operational problems facing
Greater Southeast Community Hospital, which is the District's current primary
source of care for the indigent, threatens to leave residents of Southeast D.C.
without access to an acute care hospital. In this section, the principal federal and
local policy decisions that have contributed to the demise of Southeast D.C.'s
hospitals will be critiqued. In addition, privatization of inner-city public heath care
systems will be discussed in order to assess the effect of the privatization of D.C.'s
indigent health care program on the current state of the system.
1. History of PoorManagement and Reliance on Limited D. C. Resources
The D.C. government operated D.C. General Hospital until 1997, when its
operation was assumed by the quasi-public Public Benefit Corporation (PBC).
This freed the hospital from the city's contracting and procurement regulations and
allowed it to compete in the market, which the city hoped would make the hospital
more financially stable. 2
After the PBC assumed control, the city allotted D.C. General millions in
annual subsidies, but the hospital had a long history of cash flow shortfalls and

69. Steve Vogel, 'if I Was Shot, This is Where I'd Want to Go,' WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1998, at
W10, availableat 1998 WL 3460116.

70. Id. at 3.
71. Craig Timberg, For Trauma Care, Miles to Go in D.C.; Teen's Death Raises Questions on
ERs, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WL 67886609.
72. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 29. See also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Health
Carefor the Poor and UninsuredAfter a Public Hospital's Closure or Conversion, ASSESSING THE
NEW

FEDERALISM

OCCASIONAL

PAPER

No.

39,

Sept.

2000,

at

2,

available

at

(last visited Jan. 31, 2004) ("[p]ublic
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/309647_occa39.pdf
hospitals.. .often have trouble responding to.. .challenges as nimbly as private competitors, as
management flexibility and access to capital are harder to achieve under public ownership.").
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reliance on city funds once it exceeded its annual budget. 73 For example, the
hospital was predicted to use up its subsidy for fiscal year 2001, $45.3 million,
approximately six months into the fiscal year.74 D.C. General was also in need of
major renovations and had "suffered from years of inadequate maintenance and
capital investment." 75 This combination of financial woes led to frequent
suggestions from individual members of the D.C. government and the United
76
States Congress that the hospital be closed in order to reduce costs.
2. Dependence on Medicaid Funds
As noted above, the District has a large number of Medicaid beneficiaries.
The dependence of the population on Medicaid results in a situation in which some
D.C. hospitals cannot afford to remain open without Medicaid funding. In 1995,
approximately 23% of inpatient days for all hospitals in the District were attributed
to Medicaid patients, compared with a national average of less than 15%.77
Although reliance on Medicaid funding may be a problem faced by many
hospitals in urban areas, the extent of reliance by inner-city hospitals treating poor
patients, such as D.C. General, is unparalleled.78 Medicaid beneficiaries, because
of residential segregation and their low-income status, are concentrated in certain
neighborhoods and are likely to seek care at hospitals near their homes. Due to the
large number of poor residents living in close proximity to D.C. General, and
because of its reputation as a public hospital dedicated to serving the poor, D.C.
General received much of its compensation for services provided from the
Medicaid system. Over 42% of inpatient days at D.C. General were attributable to
Medicaid. 79 This high number, however, may not adequately represent the full

73. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE LIBRARY OF CONG., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY 2002: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4 (2002) [hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS]
74. For the Record: D.C. General to Specify Cuts, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 11, 2000, at 18

[hereinafter For the Record].
75. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 26.

76. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 4-5 (detailing the debate over whether to
restructure or close D.C. General because of its financial crisis). Note that these problems are not
uncommon for public hospitals. Public hospitals often receive most of their revenue from a locality
with a fixed tax base. In addition, public hospitals have "generally high staff-patient ratios, and often
aging capital plants." Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 2.
77. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 12.
78. See LAURIE KAYE ABRAHAM, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF DEAD: THE FAILURE OF HEALTH

CARE INURBAN AMERICA 5 (1993) ("Hospitals have come to rely on a perverse system of cost shifting:
that is, covering the costs of uninsured, Medicaid, and Medicare patients by charging the privately
insured higher and higher rates, which in turn increases the premiums employers and workers pay and
contributes to the middle-class health care squeeze. It is a game of dominoes, but one that ... hospitals
that treat mostly poor patients cannot play" because most of their patients do not have commercial
insurance).
79. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 12.

2004]

UNEQUAL ACCESS

extent to which D.C. General relied on Medicaid for its financial survival. Due to
the high levels of uncompensated care provided by D.C. General, a smaller
percentage of its patients were paying patients than those of other hospitals in the
city. Thus, Medicaid patients comprised a substantial portion of D.C. General's
paying patients.
3. Uncompensated CareBurden
Inner-city hospitals are more likely than hospitals in affluent areas to provide
uncompensated care, and public hospitals often provide the most uncompensated
care. 80 This may be due to a lack of primary care services available to poor innercity residents, who then report to emergency rooms as their initial point of contact.
This has held true in the District, where despite the existence of many other
hospitals and academic medical centers (AMCs), approximately 36% of
uncompensated care was provided by the public hospital, D.C. General. 8' Before
the closing of its inpatient unit, D.C. General and its associated clinics provided
more than 50% of the primary care services for D.C. residents.82 Data from the
American Hospital Association and the District of Columbia Hospital Association
show that D.C. General had more emergency room visits in both 1991 and 1996
(the two years studied) than any other D.C. hospital.83
In 1996, D.C. General had more than $74 million in uncompensated care
costs, a number more than double that of Howard University Hospital, which
provided the second highest amount of uncompensated care. 84 Other AMCs in the
District had vastly smaller burdens of uncompensated care, with George
Washington University Hospital at almost $12 million and Georgetown University
Hospital at less than $9 million. 85 This is in contrast to many other cities, where
despite their distance from areas of poor black concentration, AMCs tend to
provide significant levels of uncompensated care. 86 Yet in D.C., with its
abundance of AMCs, academic mission does not appear to be a driving force in the

80. "Public hospitals, in cities that have them, almost always provide the largest proportion of care
to low-income populations."
PENALTY:

NEW

DENNIS P. ANDRULIS, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, THE URBAN HEALTH

DIMENSIONS

AND

DIRECTIONS

IN

INNER-CITY

HEALTH

CARE,

available at

http://www.acponline.org/hpp/pospaper/andrulis.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
81. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supranote 48, at 14 tbl.5.
82. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 6.

83. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 13 tbl.4. Public hospitals are often leaders in
trauma care, partly because trauma care "can be underprovided in the private sector for fear of attracting
less well-insured patients." Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 1. Some speculate that D.C. General
handled more than half of the District's trauma cases. See Vogel, supra note 69.
84. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supranote 48, at 14 tbl.5.
85. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 14 tbl.5.
86. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supranote 48, at 17.
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delivery of uncompensated care.87 Thus, D.C.'s poor black residents have fewer
options for accessing health care services, and the geographic health care gap is
intensified.
Medicare andMedicaidDisproportionateShare Hospitals (DSH)
Both Medicare and Medicaid make additional payments to hospitals treating
a large percentage of poor patients in order to help those hospitals offset some of
the costs associated with uncompensated care. For example, in 2001, hospitals in
the United States received approximately $5 billion in Medicare disproportionate
88
share hospital (DSH) payments and $6.7 billion in Medicaid DSH payments.
D.C. hospitals received $45.7 million in DSH funding (Medicare and Medicaid
combined) in 2000, an amount that did not adequately compensate D.C. hospitals
89
for uncompensated care to patients in emergency rooms and outpatient settings.
Without sufficient DSH payments, the few hospitals that provide significant
amounts of uncompensated care face financial crises, further endangering the
ability of D.C.'s black poor to access health care services.
To fund the DSH program, the federal government has established an
allotment that it will contribute annually to each state.90 States must contribute
revenues to the program in order to receive the federal funds. 9' States contributing
a larger amount have a greater ability to access more federal money up to a
statutorily defined limit. 92 However, federal DSH funds have been threatened with
many cuts since the passage of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, including scheduled
fiscal year 2003 cuts of $1.3 billion, or 13 percent. 93 In the 107 t h Congress,
companion bills were introduced in the House and Senate (HR 854/S 572) that
would have prevented substantial cuts in federal DSH funds scheduled to take

87. Id. ("The implication of this distribution of care is that, in Washington, geographic location
rather than academic mission is driving the provision of charity hospital care.").
88. Hadley & Holahan, supra note 55, at W3-73-74.
89. MUHAMMAD ALl PATE ET AL., WORLD BANK, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR THE
POOR: A CASE STUDY OF THE WASHINGTON D.C. PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS REFORMS 8-9

(2003). The formula used to distribute DHS funds has been criticized for only partially compensating
hospitals for uninsured admissions, and for a complete failure to account for charity care provided in
emergency rooms and outpatient clinics. See id.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(f) (2000); See also CLARE KELLY, NAT'L ASS'N CHILDRENs HOSPS. &
RELATED INSTS., INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?, CHILD. HOSP. TODAY, Spring

2002,
available
at
http://www.childrenshospitals.net/content/ContentGroups/Publications
/ChildrensHospitalsToday/Articles/20021 I/Introduction toMedicaidMissionImpossible_.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(a) (2000). See also KELLY, supra note 90, at 3.
92. KELLY, supra note 90, at 3.
93. KELLY, supra note 90, at 3.
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effect in 2003. 94 Unfortunately, these bills stalled in committee, leaving the DSH
payments, so desperately needed by inner-city hospitals, vulnerable to further cuts.
4. Privatizationof Urban Indigent Health Care Systems
Closing D. C. General andPrivatizingD. C. 's Indigent Health CcareSystem
By late 2000, the Mayor and the D.C. financial control board were convinced
that the obstacles of poor management at D.C. General and the hospital's
increasing reliance on funds from the city budget were burdens too significant to
overcome. 95 On April 30, 2001, the D.C. control board abolished the Public
Benefit Corporation, and the contract for the District's safety net system was
offered to a private health care system. 96 As part of this process, D.C. General's
inpatient unit was closed by the District government and replaced with the D.C.
Healthcare Alliance, consisting of Greater Southeast Community Hospital as the
primary site, and several other facilities that would receive funding for care to
eligible patients.97 D.C. General's emergency room remained open, with Greater
Southeast planning to absorb the additional emergency visits caused by the change
in D.C. General's status.98 However, Greater Southeast never had the capacity to
absorb the additional burdens imposed on its emergency room, 99 and failed to
develop a trauma center to replace D.C. General's heavily used trauma center."' °
This caused a significant increase in emergency room visits at other hospitals
throughout the city, in addition to a considerable number of emergency room
closures and diversions due to overcapacity.' 0 1 Providence Hospital, Howard
University Hospital, and Washington Hospital Center have all seen "double digit
percentage increases in uninsured patients in the emergency room" since the

94. Medicaid Safety Net Hospital Continued Preservation Act of 2001, H.R. 854, 107th Cong.
(2001); Medicaid Safety Net Hospital Preservation Act of 2001, S. 572, 107th Cong. (2001).
95. By 2001, the D.C. government was providing D.C. General more than $45 million in subsidies.
See For the Record,supra note 74.
96. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 5.
97. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 5.
98. See Daniel P. McClean, As Health Care Safety Net Unravels, D.C. HospitalsNeed Help -Stat,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2003, at B8, availableat 2003 WL 62215209.
99. In fact, Greater Southeast experienced fewer emergency department visits in May - June 2003
than during the same time period in 2002, even though hospitals throughout the rest of the city saw their
numbers increase. See A Health Emergency, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2003, at A 18, available at 2003
WL 62215753.
100. McClean, supranote 98. See also Timberg, supra note 71.
101. "[T]hose who rely on emergency rooms are facing longer waits, and hospitals complain of
sharply increased demands. Ambulance drivers are finding that the city's other emergency rooms are
so backlogged that they increasingly are turning away all but the most urgent cases." Timberg, supra
note 71.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

closure of D.C. General's inpatient services.'0 2 From the period of January
through August 2002, Washington Hospital Center's emergency room was closed
or diverted for more than 1200 hours, and Howard University Hospital's
03
emergency room was closed or diverted for more than 1000 hours.'
Despite these emergency care problems, D.C. officials have closed D.C.
General's emergency room and transformed it into an urgent care center for minor
emergencies.' 4 Under this plan, ambulances have ceased delivering patients to
D.C. General. 0 5 District officials have also proposed the elimination of five
outpatient specialty clinics at the D.C. General site, leaving patients of those clinics
with no choice but to obtain care outside of their neighborhood or to go without
care. 106
At the same time, the sole remaining acute care hospital serving Southeast
D.C. is facing serious threats to its continued existence. In 2001, Greater Southeast
Community Hospital'0 7 became the primary facility in D.C.'s privatized indigent
health care system, known as the D.C. Healthcare Alliance. Greater Southeast is
owned by Doctors Community HealthCare Corporation of Arizona, a private
hospital system that signed a contract with the District government to operate the
D.C. Healthcare Alliance.'0 8
However, Doctors Community HealthCare
Corporation faced significant financial instability in 2002, forcing the city to place
management and oversight of the D.C. Healthcare Alliance back in the hands of
the D.C. Health Department in early 2003.109
Following the financial troubles of its parent company, Greater Southeast is
fighting for its financial survival and was granted bankruptcy protection, allowing

102. The Status of the Closure of the D.C. Health and Hosp. Pub. Benefits Corp. and Transition of
Servs. Formerly Providedat D.C. Gen. Hasp. to GreaterSoutheast Cmty. Hosp., HearingBefore the
Comm. on Human Servs. of the Councilof the Districtof Columbia 14th Sess. 2 (D.C. 2001) (testimony
of Robert A. Malson, President, D.C. Hosp. Ass'n) [hereinafter The Status of the Closure], available at
http://www.dcwatch.com/issues/pbc010622f.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
103. ROBERT A. MALSON, D.C. HosP. ASS'N, HEALTHCARE SUMMIT 2002: STATUS OF HOSPITALS
9, availableat http://www.dcha.org/Advocacy/SUMMIT%202002.ppt (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
104. New Urgent Care Center Open at D.C. General Health Campus, HEALTH MATTERS (D.C.
Dep't of Health Employee Newsletter Vol. 1, Issue 2, Wash., D.C.), May 2003, at 3.
105. See Timberg, supra note 71.
106. Avram Goldstein, Proposal Targets ER at D.C. General, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at B4,
available at 2003 WL 2369056 ("Clinics marked for closing specialize in allergies, audiology,
pulmonology... nephrology,... renal dialysis, and rheumatology").
107. Greater Southeast was founded with a mission to serve the poor residents of Southeast D.C.
and its client base has traditionally been largely African-American and Medicare or Medicaid-eligible.
ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 11, 20.
108. See Avram Goldstein, Millions Spent as SE HospitalDeclined, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2003, at
B I, availableat 2003 WL 13334824.
109. Id. Doctors' lender, National Century Financial Enterprises of Ohio, declared bankruptcy amid
an FBI investigation into alleged financial wrongdoings, causing Doctors' to lose access to the cash
flow needed to run its five hospitals. Id.
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These cuts are being
hospital management to dramatically cut costs.'10
accomplished through staff layoffs and emergency room closures and diversions
that gravely impact the hospital's ability to care for the District's neediest
residents."' The situation at Greater Southeast has become so dire that the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has denied the hospital
re-accreditation, citing a slew of operational and safety problems. 1 2 Greater
Southeast is unlikely to survive financially after losing its accreditation, because
most private health plans and the District's own indigent plan generally refuse to
reimburse for services at unaccredited hospitals." 3 In addition, unaccredited
hospitals are subjected to intense scrutiny from the federal Medicare and Medicaid
programs." 4 The Health Department is currently working with Greater Southeast
Community Hospital to continue Alliance funding and ensure the hospital's
survival. 1 5 However, if the hospital is forced to close, there will be no fullservice, acute care hospital left in Southeast D.C.1 6 Faced with this grim prospect,

110. Avram Goldstein, HospitalsSeek to Block Planfor Southeast, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at
B 1, availableat 2003 WL 13332089.
111. See id.
112. Avram Goldstein, Greater Southeast's Accreditation in Jeopardy, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
2003, at B2, available at 2003 WL 15467345 (hospital's accreditation was denied on March 19, 2002);
Avram Goldstein, Greater Southeast Hospital's Accreditation at Risk, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2003, at
B8, available at 2003 WL 13335264 ("Inspectors cited Greater Southeast for inadequate training,
leadership, planning, quality control, documentation, cleanliness and building maintenance. Also cited
were serious errors in giving blood transfusions."); Chris Silva, GreaterSoutheast Lays Out Program to
Get WellAgain, WASH. Bus. J. (Sept. 1, 2003).
113. Chris Silva, Greater Southeast Resuscitation Depends Upon Appeal, WASH. BUS. J. (July 28,
2003); Chris Silva, Greater Southeast Situation Triggers Aetna Withdrawal, WASH. BUS. J. (Sept. 8,
2003).
114. Goldstein, GreaterSoutheast Hospital'sAccreditation at Risk, supra note 112.
115. Although Greater Southeast Community Hospital temporarily lost its license from the D.C.
Department of Health, it was recently issued a restricted license. The hospital is being monitored by the
Department of Health. Press Release, D.C. Department of Health, D.C. DOH Issues Restricted License
to Greater Southeast Community Hospital (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://dchealth.dc.gov
/news room/release.asp?id=1 82&mon=20031 I(last visited Jan. 31, 2004); Avram Goldstein, Greater
Southeast Regains License; City Officials Limit InpatientPopulation, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2003, at B 1,
availableat 2003 WL 62228551.
116. See D.C. PRIMARY CARE ASS'N, supra note 2, at 7. The one other hospital in Southeast D.C.,
Hadley Memorial, is primarily a long-term care unit. It does not have an emergency room. Some
politicians have proposed innovative partnerships to create new health care institutions accessible to
residents of Southeast D.C. For instance, David Catania, an at-large member of the D.C. Council, has
repeatedly proposed the creation of an Urban Health Care Campus in partnership with the National
Institutes of Health, to be located on the grounds of D.C. General. Such creative ideas offer promise,
but much more information regarding funding and operation are needed before this idea can be
seriously considered as a long-term solution. See David A. Catania, Editorial: Code Blue for D.C.
Health Care, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at B8, availableat 2002 WL 103571723.
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Mayor Williams has recently proposed partnering with Howard University
1 17
Hospital to build a new hospital on the D.C. General site.
Does privatizationhave to fail?
Many citizens and advocates have criticized the D.C. government's
decision to privatize its indigent health care delivery system, arguing that a private
organization cannot effectively operate a health care system for the poor, because
private hospitals tend to discriminate on the basis of ability to pay."H8 Opponents
of privatization have also argued that private hospitals lack the public mission of
caring for the poor and the sociocultural understanding needed to best serve poor,
minority populations. 119 Proponents counter that public systems are ineffective at
providing care in a cost-effective manner, and that public hospitals are overly
bureaucratic, which wastes valuable time and money for government and
patients. 120
Despite gloomy predictions, case studies have indicated that privatization
efforts are not doomed to failure; however, these efforts must be carefully planned
so as not to abandon the community being served. Privatization efforts in
Milwaukee, Boston, and Tampa during the 1990s have all been considered largely
successful thus far, because the public hospitals, rather than being closed, were
sold to private health care organizations, thus assuring that the facilities would
remain intact in their locations. 12 1 In addition, those three privatization efforts all
involved extensive efforts to encourage patients to use primary care clinics instead
of hospital-based services. In contrast, the privatization of the Philadelphia
General Hospital in 1977 drew criticism from around the country when the hospital
22
was simply closed and the buildings demolished, with no successor planned.1
Although the city of Philadelphia did later increase funding for primary care clinics
and encourage patients to use them more frequently, earlier failures still loom over
23
that particular privatization effort.'
These examples support the contention that geography is central to the
adequate provision of indigent health care. Where societal and structural factors
have, as in D.C. and in Philadelphia, created a health care gap in poor
neighborhoods, simply abandoning those neighborhoods and their existing health
care providers is an ineffective means of improving health status. Allowing
117. Craig Timberg & Avram Goldstein, HospitalProposalSeen as Reversal, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2003, at Cl, available at 2003 WL 62227888. Note that major details, such as control over, and
funding for the new hospital, have not been finalized as of the date of publication.
118. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 2.
119. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 2-3.
120. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 3.
121. See Bovbjerg et al., supranote 72, at 5-6.
122. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 72, at 9-11.
123. See Bovbjerg et al., supranote 72, at 19.
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Greater Southeast Community Hospital to simply close down, leaving Southeast
D.C. without a hospital much in the way that inner-city Philadelphians were left
out in the cold, would prove a very risky gamble for Mayor Williams and the D.C.
government.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Normative Argument
It is generally accepted that there is no constitutional right to social welfare
services, such as the provision of health care, in the United States. Moreover, the
last time the idea of universal health coverage or health care as part of the social
contract was raised on a national level, there was a significant backlash, both
against the administration in power and against universal health proposals in
general. However, the concept of health care as a right is an ongoing part of our
national dialogue. Mayor Williams has referred to the right to health care and his
commitment to "ensuring that every man, woman and child has access to quality
health care regardless of their ability to pay.' 24 In addition, the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research has stopped short of asserting that there is a moral "right" to
health care, but has stated that society has a moral obligation to ensure equity in
access to the provision of health care. 25 American society continues to accept that
the elderly have a right to health care; under the Medicare program the elderly
have benefited from universal coverage for almost forty years.
Progressive policy experts and free market economists regularly face off in
the health policy arena, arguing over how much variation in health care access our
society is willing to accept based on socioeconomic status. Although there is a
clear ambivalence in America about the plight of the poor and a bias against the
uninsured, few Americans would be comfortable with explicitly allowing the
provision of health care to be compromised simply because of poverty. 126 It is
clear to many Americans that it is not acceptable to allow the gap between the
"haves" and "have-nots" to grow even wider by eliminating all rights of the poor
and uninsured in the name of commercialism. This is illustrated through continued
federal intervention in the medical marketplace, with laws such as the Examination
and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in Labor Act

124. D.C. WATCH,

MAYOR'S COMMITMENT TO A

HEALTHY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(2001),

available at http://www.dcwatch.com/mayor/OI0220.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
125. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL

IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 32 (1983).

126. See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1484 (1994) ("We
feel morally comfortable if sick people have health care-and uncomfortable if they do not....").
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(EMTALA), which forbids hospitals27with emergency rooms from "dumping" poor
patients in need of emergency care.1
1. Social contract theory
Some prominent theorists have examined the role of distributive justice in
health care, arguing that poor and vulnerable members of society must be given
access to such basic goods as part of the social contract. 128 Michael Walzer argues
that a modem democratic state should provide some services, such as health care,
in return for the rights we give up as members of society. 129 We give up property
through the payment of taxes, and in return we expect the government to provide
certain public goods. "We never question whether it is the appropriate role of the
government to provide . . . interstate highways ...fire departments ...or public
schools ... [o]ur behavior indicates that this is still an expectation; that this is a
' 30
function of the social contract."'
A health care safety net should be provided through the social contract
because government can most effectively and fairly provide health care to those
who cannot purchase it themselves. This is particularly true in the case of poor,
black inner city residents, who have been marginalized and isolated from the rest
of society. Their concentration in inner city areas has compromised their access to
health care and created a health care gap structured by geography. According to
the social contract theory, citizens expect government to transcend the boundaries
of geography and preserve access to health care, because individual citizens are
1 31
unable to do so as effectively as government.
2. Moralfairness and equity
Theorists have long argued that it is incumbent upon government institutions
to provide universal access to health care to all members of society as a result of a
moral duty. Under that line of reasoning, illness is an act of God, and it is simply
unfair to overburden the poor without spreading the financial risk associated with
illness. This argument is particularly resonant in the case of the geographically
structured health care gap, because affirmative public policy choices resulted in the
ghettoization of high poverty blacks, which in turn created a health care crisis. It

127. Examination and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in Labor Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
128. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31 (1983); Pope John Paul XXIII,
Pacem in Terris, para. 8 (April 11, 1963).
129. WALZER, supra note 123 at 31 ("The primary good we distribute to one another is membership
in some human community. It determines... to whom we allocate goods and services."
130. Christine Cassel, The Right to Health Care, The Social Contract, and Health Reform in the
United States, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 53, 56 (1994).
131. See id.
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would be immoral for American society, which has been complicit in the
concentration of black poverty, to refuse to absorb any of the health care costs
resulting from ghettoization. Affluent white communities, such as those in
Northwest D.C., have benefited for years from the concentration of black poverty
found in areas such as Southeast D.C. Much of affluent white society continues to
live in poverty-free enclaves, while refusing to shoulder any of the financial burden
such as extraordinarily high morbidity and
created by concentrated black poverty,
1 32
blacks.
ghettoized
for
rates
mortality
It is incumbent upon the federal government, in particular, to begin to right
some of the wrongs it created by isolating poor blacks and entrenching the black
ghetto. Jerry Frug has argued that the federal government's financial support for
suburbanization, combined with a federal housing policy that segregated poor
blacks, helped spawn concentrated black poverty. 133 Because the federal
government helped create the inner city ghettos occupied by poor blacks, it is
by redistributing
morally obligated to address the health care accessibility gap
134
disfavored.
and
favored
geographically
resources between the
3. Enlightenedself interest
Another argument is that the provision of health services to the poor
promotes social efficiency and positive externalities. Access to regular medical
care can affect the long term health of a population because preventative care may
reduce the prevalence of serious health conditions. 135 The health care accessibility
gap creates extraordinarily burdensome costs for society directly, through more
uncompensated emergency room visits and indirectly through the need for
expensive future treatments. 136 Poor blacks that don't have access to primary care
services do not benefit from preventive care and early detection of diseases, and
therefore may suffer from chronic illnesses at very high rates. Chronic illnesses
are expensive to treat, and patients with chronic illnesses tend to require costly
emergency room-based care on a frequent basis. 137 Emergency room visits by the
poor are often uncompensated, causing financial crises for hospitals serving large
numbers of poor patients. 138 Uncompensated emergency room visits are even

132. See supra Part 1.A.2.
133. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1068-70 (1995-1996)
(describing the manner in which defense spending, federal highway development, and the Federal
Housing Acts of 1937, 1949, and 1954 helped create the black ghetto).
134. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4.
135. See J. LEE HARGRAVES, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF: RACE,
ETHNICITY AND PREVENTATIVE SERVICES: No GAINS FOR HISPANICS (Jan. 2001).
136. See MARIE C. REED & HA T. TU, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF:
TRIPLE JEOPARDY: Low INCOME, CHRONICALLY ILL AND UNINSURED IN AMERICA (Feb. 2002).

137. See STATE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV. AGENCY, supranote 50, at 14.
138. D.C. HOSP. ASS'N, FISCAL INDICATORS FISCAL YEAR 2002 3 (2003).
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worrisome for hospitals with privately insured patients, because those costs are
diverted in additional fees to insurance companies, which result in higher insurance
premiums for all members of society. 1 39 Increased emergency room visits due to
high levels of chronic illness also cause emergency rooms to quickly reach
capacity, resulting in ambulance diversions and overcrowding, even at hospitals in
affluent areas. 140 Such overcrowding will strain the resources of even the most
profitable hospitals, possibly affecting overall quality of care. Thus, if society
refuses to act now to remedy the geographic health care gap, all members of
society, including the affluent, will eventually face higher health care costs and a
less efficient health care system.
B. Recommendationsfor the FederalGovernment
1. Increase number of NationalHealth Service Corpsproviders assignedto
the Districtof Columbia.
Individuals living in medically underserved areas "have little or no access to
primary health care services because the demand for services exceeds the available
resources, the services are located a great distance away, or are otherwise
inaccessible.'' al The National Health Service Corps attempts to ease this burden
by encouraging physicians to practice in federally designated HSPAs in exchange
for scholarships and loan assistance. 142 From 1972 to 1987, the National Health
Service Corps program attracted 13,600 doctors, dentists, nurses, and other health
professionals into medically underserved areas. 143 However, when the Reagan
Administration eliminated program funding in 1988, many poor communities lost
the physicians placed through the National Health Service Corps.'44
Although the program was reborn in the 1990s, it has historically been
underfunded, despite its potential to bring physicians into the neighborhoods where

139. Allan N. Johnson & David Aquilina, The Cost Shifting Issue, I HEALTH AFFAIRS 101 (1982).
140. See D.C. HOSP. ASS'N, supra note 138; see also REED & TU, supranote 136.

141. NAT'L HEALTH SERV. CORPS, 30 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE UNDERSERVED, available at
ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/nhsc/factsheets/General-lnfo-NHSC.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004 ).
142. See Kristine Marietti Byrnes, Is There a Primary Care Doctor in the House? The Legislation
Needed to Address a National Shortage, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 809-11 (1994). The Scholarship
program allows medical students to obligate themselves to practice in an underserved area following
graduation. The Repayment program allows medical school graduates and students in their final years
of medical school to work in medically underserved areas in exchange for loan repayment applied to
outstanding loan balances. Physicians who default on their obligations are liable to the United States
government for treble damages. See id.
143. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 44 (1990).

144. Id. at 721. See also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-96-28, NATIONAL HEALTH
SERVICE CORPS: OPPORTUNITIES TO STRETCH SCARCE DOLLARS AND IMPROVE PROVIDER PLACEMENT

(1995) (documenting benefits of NHSC loan repayment program).

2004]

UNEQUAL ACCESS

primary care services are most desperately needed. In early March 2003, however,
the Bush Administration proposed a $42 million increase for the National Health
Service Corps, which would help support a total of almost 4,300 doctors, dentists
and other health care professionals. 145 The additional funding would nearly double
the number of physicians that the program supported in 2001.146 This funding
increase would be a great first step toward making the program part of a long-term
solution to the recurring PCP shortage in Southeast D.C. It will only have an
impact on the lives of those in Southeast D.C., however, if more of the
participating physicians are located in the District, and in the Southeastern
quadrant in particular. According to the D.C. Primary Care Office, there were only
twenty-six National Health Service Corps providers in D.C. in 1999.14' The D.C.
Primary Care Office has set a modest goal of increasing that number to thirty-six
providers by 2010.148 Undoubtedly, the D.C. government has tried to set an
attainable goal; however, this number seems woefully inadequate. Nearly 25% of
the D.C. population is underserved by primary care physicians, and there are
572,059 D.C. residents according to the 2000 U.S. Census. 149 That means that
approximately 143,000 D.C. residents are currently medically underserved. It
seems unlikely that adding ten physicians will do much to change those dynamics.
Rather, the federal government should commit to supplying the District with
a mere 2% of the nearly 2,000 physicians who will be added through the
President's proposed budget increases, resulting in an increase of approximately
forty physicians. Given the District's abysmal health statistics, a strong case can
be made that poor D.C. residents are in particularly dire need of additional primary
care physicians. The federal government should not pass up this opportunity to
make a positive impact on the health and lives of D.C. residents, who have a moral
right to health care. In addition, it has been demonstrated time and time again that
the health status of a population increases when regular preventive care is received,
resulting in decreased expenditures on high-cost services, such as emergency
department visits, and overall decreases in Medicaid and Medicare expenditures
due to fewer chronic conditions in need of treatment. 150 It would be wise, both

145. Press Release, DHHS, President Proposing Action "On Many Fronts" to Assist Uninsured
(Mar. 10, 2003), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030310.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
146. Id.
147. The District of Columbia, Healthy People 2010 Plan: A Strategy for Better Health 13, 44
(Sept. 2000), available at http://dchealth.dc.gov/information/healthypeople20O0/pdf/DC-HP2010Plan.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
148. Id.
149. See STATE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV. AGENCY, supra note 50, at 10; D.C. PRIMARY CARE
ASS'N, supra note 17, at 6.
150. See STATE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV. AGENCY, supra note 50, at 14 ("It is reasonable to
hypothesize that greater use of primary and preventive care, as well as other lifestyle changes will
reduce the burden of chronic disease among African Americans. The result of these changes may lead
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ethically and fiscally, for the government to make this investment in the health
status of poor, underserved residents of Southeast D.C.
2. Ensure minimum Medicaidand Medicare DSH allotmentsfor all states
andprevent reductions in Medicaid andMedicare DSH.
Despite a recent period of prosperity, structural and legal constraints such as
large amounts of tax-exempt federal land and an inability to tax wages earned by
nonresidents, have combined with post-September 11 th tourism losses to put the
District at risk for severe budget shortfalls. In fact, in a report commissioned by
the Federal City Council, McKinsey & Company, Inc. predicted that the District
could experience a $500 million deficit by 2005.'
At a time when the District faces the prospect of a serious budget crisis,
significant cuts in federal DSH allotments could make it even more difficult to
financially support the Medicaid program. In addition, hospitals serving the poor
need the protection provided by DSH payments to prevent additional financial
strains, or even closures. Without reasonable DSH payments, hospitals that have
traditionally provided a disproportionate share of uncompensated care may be
unable to continue serving the poor in large numbers, thus further threatening the
access of the poor to health care services.
The D.C. Department of Health fiscal year 2003 budget included $39.4
million for DSH payments. 152 The federal 70% match of $27.58 million combined
with the District's budgeted amount results in $66.98 million to be distributed to
hospitals in the District, a substantial increase over the $45.7 million in DSH
funding that D.C.hospitals received in 2000.153 However, significant nationwide
reductions in DSH funding took effect in 2003, endangering the 70% match that
the District had been receiving. 154 Interested national lobbying organizations, such
as the National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems and the
National Association of Urban Hospitals intensively lobbied Congress, trying to

to reduced emergency room utilization and improved morbidity and mortality. The same argument
holds true for other ethnic underserved groups with poor health status.").
151. See FED. CITY COUNCIL, MCKINSEY & Co., ASSESSING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S
FINANCIAL POSITION 2 (2002).

152. Testimony of Robert A. Malson, President, District of Columbia Hospital Association,
Concerning the District of Columbia Department of Health's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget 3, April 17,
2002.
153. See MUHAMMAD ALl PATE ET AL., supra note 89, at 8-9 (providing the amounts received by
D.C. hospitals in 2000); ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 7 (explaining that the current match rate is
70% in D.C.).
154. NAT'L ASS'N OF URBAN HOsP., POSITION STATEMENT ON: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE

SHARE (April 2003), available at www.nauh.org/Docs/positions/ppmedicaid dsh.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2004).
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15 5
get legislation passed to prevent cuts to Medicaid and Medicare DSH money.
One result is the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act
156
of 2003, which established a temporary increase in Medicaid DSH payments.
For most states, the increases will be effective for Fiscal Year 2004.157 Although
this legislation represents a positive first step, the United States Congress should
pass legislation preventing future reductions in DSH payment levels.

C. Recommendationsfor Local Government
Ideally, patients should have access to health care near their homes. Patients
need care in their neighborhoods, and the transportation obstacles facing poor
minority residents make it difficult for them to travel in order to obtain care.
Given that Greater Southeast Community Hospital is the only acute care hospital
east of the Anacostia River, and that it remains the centerpiece of the D.C.
Healthcare Alliance, the District government is attempting to secure the hospital's
future.
In an effort to save Greater Southeast, the hospital and the Health Department
consented to a decree aimed at improving safety and record-keeping at the
hospital. 5 8 The decree required that hospital administrators update the Health
Department on a daily basis and allow a representative of the Department to be
stationed at the hospital temporarily to more closely monitor improvement
efforts. 159 Following a 60-day period, Greater Southeast was issued a restricted
0
license. However, the long-term survival of the hospital remains uncertain.16
While city officials await the results of Greater Southeast's improvement
efforts and wrangle over whether (and how) to open a new hospital, they must also
make contingency plans. In the event that Greater Southeast Community Hospital
is forced to close, the surge of patients into other clinics and hospitals throughout
the city will only increase. The Health Department must plan for such an event by

155. Testimony of Robert A. Malson, President, District of Columbia Hospital Association,

Concerning the District of Columbia Department of Health's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget, April 17, 2002;
See
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156. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, § 1001.
157. For states with extremely low DSH allotments, increases will continue through Fiscal Year
2008. Id.
158. Monte Reel, Southeast Hospital Agrees To Term; D.C. Gives 60 Days For Improvements,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at BI, available at 2003 WL 56512577.
159. Id.
160. Avram Goldstein, Greater Southeast's PerilJeopardizes Area Health System; Patients, Other
HospitalsFear Closure, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at C3, availableat 2003 WL 67884826.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

adequately reimbursing those facilities for care to Alliance members and by
requiring that all city hospitals share the uncompensated care burden.
1.Providefundingforemergency care to non-Alliance hospitals
experiencingsubstantialincreases in emergency room visits.
The problems experienced by D.C. General and Greater Southeast have had
significant effects on D.C.'s non-alliance hospitals, particularly on emergency
rooms experiencing large numbers of visits from Alliance members. 16 1 Since the
closure of D.C. General's emergency room, emergency room closures
and
62
diversions at many of the District's hospitals have become commonplace.1
Until this crisis has been managed and the slew of emergency room closures
and diversions normalizes to a level seen by other comparable cities, the District
should reimburse any hospital located within its borders for emergency care
provided to Alliance members.' 63 It is unreasonable, in the chaos that has ensued
since D.C. General's closure, to expect Alliance members (or ambulance drivers)
facing a medical crisis to avoid the emergency rooms of certain hospitals simply
because those hospitals are not Alliance members. It is equally unreasonable to
expect hospitals to voluntarily provide care to Alliance members without receiving
normal payment from the District's indigent health care program.
2. Increase and enforce minimum uncompensatedcare requirementsfor all
Districthospitals.
The District government should increase uncompensated care requirements
for private hospitals, so that hospitals in more affluent neighborhoods share a
larger portion of the burden of uncompensated care. The current level of
uncompensated care that hospitals are legally obligated to provide annually is
equivalent to 3% of adjusted patient revenues. 164 In poor neighborhoods such as
those in the Southeast quadrant, this requirement is insufficient to meet demand.
Yet for hospitals in more affluent areas of the District, "demand for free care is
much lower" and the uncompensated care requirement is "rarely enforced.' ' 165 For
example, if Greater Southeast Hospital were to close, the uncompensated care

161. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 98-101 for statistics.
163. On March 3, 2003, the D.C. Hospital Association reportedly convinced the D.C. Department
of Health to agree that any Alliance patient brought to any D.C. hospital by emergency transport will be
covered, without regard to whether the hospital is a member of the Alliance. See Avram Goldstein,
Hospitals, City Agree on Future ofD.C. General; Plan Would Turn Emergency Room into Urgent Care
Center,Protect Other Providers, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at BI, available at 2003 WL 15463626.
However, no information relating to that agreement, such as an "effective" date or whether the
agreement will be retroactive, has been made public.
164. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 38.
165. ORMOND ET AL., supra note 18, at 39.
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burden would largely shift to hospitals in the center portion of the city, such as
Howard University Hospital or Children's Hospital, which already carry a
significant uncompensated care burden, rather than to hospitals west of Rock
Creek Park, such as Georgetown, or George Washington.' 66 The skewed
uncompensated care distribution places a tremendous burden on any hospital
geographically located in a poor neighborhood. The D.C. government's failure to
act puts certain hospitals at a competitive disadvantage and fails to promote
efficient care.
The idea of forcing hospitals to provide a minimum amount of
uncompensated care is not new or peculiar to the District. Many states maintain
such requirements. However, some states, rather than simply imposing a minimum
requirement, have instituted creative means of evenly allocating the responsibility
for providing uncompensated care across hospitals, such as "charity care pools,
hospital rate-setting, or expansion of publicly sponsored or subsidized insurance
programs.' 67 Although the District government will likely face significant
resistance from interested parties such as the District of Columbia Hospital
Association, a lobbying group for D.C.'s hospitals, it can and should require its'
geographic units to work together to narrow the divide between rich and poor
communities. This has been done in another context in the Twin Cities, where the
Fiscal Disparities Plan allows poor communities to receive more funds than they
contribute to the tax base by redistributing pooled property tax funds among all
local governments. 168 Tax-base sharing improves the regional distribution of
resources much in the same way a health care charity pool might.
Some states have been successfully using charity care pools for decades. For
example, Massachusetts established an uncompensated care pool in 1985, requiring
insurance companies and later, managed care organizations, to pay a surcharge on
hospital costs. 169 Hospitals are then required to pay into the pool any revenue

received from those surcharges that exceed their costs. Although changes have

166. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 31. "Hospitals west of the park were frank in their

appraisal of the uncompensated care situation. No active measures are needed to avoid uninsured
patients because the hospitals' location makes high levels of uncompensated care unlikely. When
queried about what effect closure of a hospital east of the park] might have on their hospital, each of
these hospitals suggested that the burden would then fall on some other hospital east of the park.
Hospitals east of the park tended to agree with this assessment." ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note
48, at 31 ..
167. ORMOND AND BOVBJERG, supra note 48, at 47.
168. See The Rusk Report, Twin Cities Tax-Base Sharing, YORK DAILY RECORD, Nov. 20, 1997,
available at http://www.ydr.com/projects/rusk/lruskz.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); LEAGUE OF
MINN. CITIES, FISCAL DISPARITIES 101 (2003), available at http://www.lmnc.org/proptax/fiscall0l.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
169. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I18G, § 18 (West 2003); UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL:
SURCHARGE PAYER INFORMATION, available at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcfp/pages/dhcfp_70.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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been made to the program over the years, it remains in place today. Connecticut

also has a similar program.

170

CONCLUSION
The District government, despite pursuing generous indigent care policies
and innovative solutions to health-related fiscal problems, is experiencing a health
care crisis. In a city that has some of the worst health status statistics in the nation,
the geographically isolated residents of Southeast D.C. suffer disproportionately
from severe health conditions and limited access to health care services. Economic
and racial segregation have combined to leave the residents of Southeast D.C. in a
pocket of concentrated black poverty, where they are effectively denied access to
health care because of their color, their ability to pay, and even their location. The
difficulties of serving this poor African-American community have convinced
many physicians to practice in other areas, ANY other area, of the city. Federal
and local policy decisions have contributed to this geographic health care gap,
forcing this medically underserved population to face the possibly of losing its
only full-service hospital. This flood can be pushed back, and the health care
status of this community gradually improved, but only if both federal and local
policymakers commit to the legal and financial solutions necessary to ensure
residents of Southeast D.C. access to both primary and emergency care services.
The geographically structured health care crisis in D.C. may be more acute
than in other cities with concentrated black poverty because of unique events in the
D.C. market, such as the concurrent failure of the public hospital and the refusal of
AMCs to provide significant amounts of charity care. Yet the severe concentration
of black poverty in many American inner cities creates a risk that geography will
result in market failure in the provision of health services, leaving poor black
communities without access to health care. The challenge for those cities is to
overcome geographic constraints to health care access now, by ensuring the longterm survival of inner city hospitals catering to the poor and simultaneously taking
action to correct the mal-distribution of primary care services.
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